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Evolution of Supply 
Chain Collaboration:
Implications for the Role of Knowledge
ABSTRACT
Increasingly, research across many disciplines has recognized the shortcomings of the traditional “in-
tegration prescription” for inter-organizational knowledge management. This research conducts several 
simulation experiments to study the effects of different rates of product change, different demand envi-
ronments, and different economies of scale on the level of integration between firms at different levels in 
the supply chain. The underlying paradigm shifts from a static, steady state view to a dynamic, complex 
adaptive systems and knowledge-based view of supply chain networks. Several research propositions 
are presented that use the role of knowledge in the supply chain to provide predictive power for how 
supply chain collaborations or integration should evolve. Suggestions and implications are suggested 
for managerial and research purposes.
INTRODUCTION
Recent research indicates that the era of inter-
organizational collaboration and knowledge-
sharing has arrived under the guise of supply 
chain management. Investments in supply chain 
management provide a competitive advantage to 
business. For example, AMR’s “Supply Chain 
Top 25” grew revenue an average of 29% over the 
prior year (Hofman and Aronow, 2012). Perhaps 
more telling for the scholar of knowledge-based 
organizations are the conclusions by the World 
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Economic Forum (2012) that countries could 
grow their GDP six times more by using policies 
that address the management of supply chain 
processes instead of relying on tariffs. Supply 
chain processes tend to be knowledge-intensive 
and depend upon international collaboration, 
coordination with government entities such as 
customs, reliable physical infrastructure for trans-
portation and communications, and standardizing 
inter-organizational procedures. In a very real 
sense, supply chain management really represents 
knowledge exchange management between firms, 
with most pundits espousing “integration” of 
knowledge and processes.
Integration of inter-organizational processes 
has long comprised the prescription for success 
in supply chain management and related literature 
(Frohlich & Westbrook, 2001; Gustin, Daugherty, 
& Stank, 1995; Stock, Greis, & Kasarda, 1999). 
Information sharing and various levels of coordi-
nation and collaboration have traditionally found 
strong empirical support (c.f., Daugherty, Ellinger, 
& Gustin, 1996; Lee, Padmanabhan, & Whang, 
1997; Lummus & Vokurka, 1999; Narasimhan & 
Jayaram, 1998; Stank, Keller, & Closs, 2001; Tan, 
Kannan, & Handfield, 1998). Notwithstanding 
the oft-cited works that support the “integration 
prescription,” one systematic review of the lit-
erature revealed the link between integration and 
supply chain performance as shaky (Fabbe-Costes 
& Jahre, 2008). One simulation study found that 
information sharing may have no value at all or 
may even increase costs, depending on demand 
patterns (Jonsson and Mattsson, 2013). The 
mixed evidence suggests an incomplete theoreti-
cal understanding of integration and inter-firm 
collaboration.
One issue may be the implicit assumption that 
all collaboration is the same. Empirical studies 
that distinguish among the different manners of 
collaborating and the different outcomes to the 
various supply chain members remain relatively 
few, with Frohlich and Westbrook’s (2001) land-
mark article representing a sort of genesis of this 
body of literature. More recent work has found 
that supply chain strategies vary but seem to be-
come more sophisticated the closer the firm is to 
the market (Bourlakis, et al., 2012), despite the 
additional economies of scale and other benefits 
that firms higher up the supply chain often have. 
This may reflect the presence of hypercompeti-
tive environments characterized by the rapid rise 
and fall of firms (McNamara, Vaaler, & Devers, 
2003; Wiggins & Ruefli, 2005); retail firms that 
are not responsive to customer needs do not last 
long. Hypercompetitive environments act to “dis-
integration” supply chains as firms seek higher 
quality, lower cost or other product characteristics 
desired by the market.
Another important issue has been the realiza-
tion that the traditional conceptualizations of 
supply chain management implicitly assume a 
“steady-state” condition. Increasingly turbulent 
economic and global systems mean that supply 
chains must be adaptable and resilient to man-
age their risks—yet methods for assessing and 
managing inter-organizational network change 
remains in a nascent status (Pettit, et al., 2013). 
Supply chain agility comprises a well-established 
conceptualization of responsive and adaptable 
inter-organizational networks of firms; however, 
supply chain agility primarily focuses on descrip-
tive or normative theories rather than predictive 
capability (c.f., Gligor, et al., 2012).
In the past few years, supply chain literature has 
begun to treat supply chains as knowledge-based 
constellations of organizations. Researchers have 
increasingly focused on the question of when, 
how and why supply chain integration works (or 
doesn’t). Recent work has evaluated with whom 
companies integrate (Huo, 2012), the relationship 
of information flows to material flows (Prajogo 
and Olhager, 2012), short-term knowledge shar-
ing vs. deeper knowledge generation (Jayaram 
and Pathak, 2013), product and process strategies 
as antecedents of supply chain integration strate-
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gies (Droge, et al., 2012), and the technological 
platforms for sharing information and knowledge 
(Bendoly, et al., 2012). Implicit (and often explicit) 
to this work are supplier and customer relation-
ship management, and the benefits of long-term 
vs. short-term relationships.
Interestingly, little research has attempted to 
map supply chains, and then relate supply chain 
macro-level characteristics to knowledge needs. 
Methodological challenges mean that most past 
work has been static in nature or relied on as-
sumptions that environmental conditions remain 
constant. Few studies have assessed longitudinal 
evolution of supply chains despite the important 
potential public policy and strategic contributions 
of such research. In a sense this work represents 
an extension of the intra-firm organizational in-
fluence on knowledge management proposed by 
Nickerson and Zenger (2004).
This research assesses the patterns of collabo-
ration and firm mortality in supply chains by use 
of simulation. The pace of technological advance, 
sensitivity to economies of scale, and various mar-
ket scenarios provide the environmental control 
variables; evolutionary outcomes and degree of 
interfirm collaboration comprise the observations 
at each level of a four-tier supply chain. The re-
sulting patterns of supply chain evolution provide 
the basis for developing implications for different 
degrees of inter-firm knowledge management.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Studying and modeling supply chain evolution 
from a knowledge-exchange perspective requires 
a multi-disciplinary approach. Classical supply 
chain governance theory, adaptation, and evolu-
tion literatures provide the conceptual model for 
the subsequent simulation of inter-organizational 
evolution. Particular emphasis is paid to the inte-
gration between firms using a newly developed 
measure called the collaboration index.
Supply Chain Theory
Ronald Coase’s 1937 work on transaction costs 
offers the theoretical roots of supply chain man-
agement, prompting one scholar to describe the 
reduction of transaction costs as “the heart of 
the interest in supply chain management (Hobbs, 
1996, p.26).” Williamson, the researcher most as-
sociated with transaction costs, stated, “...whereas 
TCE examines individual transactions, SCM in-
troduced a broader systems perspective in which 
related transactions are grouped and managed 
as chains (Williamson, 2008, p. 5).” Transaction 
cost economics (TCE), sometimes referred to as 
transaction cost analysis (TCA), offers perhaps 
the most extensive empirical support of any of 
the extant exchange governance theories, with 
between 250 and 500 citations appearing annually 
in scholarly works since the early 1990s (David 
and Han, 2004).
Many scholars trace the origins of supply chain 
management to Forrester’s 1958 Harvard Business 
Review article where he stated (p. 37): “Manage-
ment is on the verge of a major breakthrough in 
understanding how industrial company success 
depends on the interaction between the flows of 
information, materials, money, manpower, and 
capital equipment.” Williamson’s conceptualiza-
tion of TCE emphasizes the adaptability of the 
interactions between firms as “the central problem 
of economic organization” (1991, p. p. 278)—and 
it is this adaptive response to environmental pres-
sures that motivates this study of supply chain 
evolution. Williamson (1975, 1986) founded his 
theoretical framework on two primary assump-
tions of human behavior (bounded rationality and 
opportunism) and two dimensions of transactions 
(frequency and asset specificity).
Bounded Rationality and Opportunism
Bounded rationality and opportunism are the two 
primary dimensions of uncertainty. Uncertainty 
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embodies any unanticipated change to the circum-
stances surrounding an exchange (Rindfleisch & 
Heide, 1997). Bounded rationality describes the 
behavioral uncertainty resulting from the cogni-
tive limits of managers who try to anticipate ev-
ery contingency in a market exchange (Leiblein, 
2003). Opportunism refers to the behavioral 
uncertainty resulting from self-interest seeking 
behavior. According to TCA, high environmental 
uncertainty increases transaction costs of due to 
the need to adapt contractual agreements to com-
pensate for unanticipated variations in volumes, 
technology/product design, sources of supply, 
doubtful customer loyalties, and other unforeseen 
circumstances.
The dimensions of uncertainty are manifesta-
tions of information asymmetries, unaligned goals, 
or lack of commitment. Industry standardization 
may reduce the risks from lack of commitment; the 
low cost of tracking electronic trails in technology 
intensive environments diminish the occurrence of 
information asymmetries (Garicano and Kaplan, 
2001). Networks and other hybrid forms of gover-
nance are characterized by standards or norms and 
a high degree of shared information. This leads to 
reduced uncertainty without incurring the costs 
associated with vertical integration while avoiding 
most opportunity costs in turbulent environments 
that require switching partners.
In terms of predictive outcomes, TCA claims 
that firms employ vertical integration as a means 
of easing the burden of performance evaluation. 
This follows from TCA’s assertion that evalua-
tion problems give rise to measurement costs. 
However, Ouchi (1979) provides an alternate view 
that measurement costs are incurred in order to 
distribute rewards across parties in an equitable 
fashion. If equitable distribution does not occur, 
an individual firm may eventually reduce its 
individual efforts, incurring opportunity costs 
resulting from the productivity losses. Ouchi’s 
insight harkens to the classical team production 
problem (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972) wherein 
labor that requires cooperative production. In this 
perspective, vertical integration will occur when 
equitable distribution becomes difficult—such as 
when margins are low for a highly commoditized 
item (resulting in larger players using bargaining 
power to increase their profits at the expense of 
suppliers or customer) or when the contribution of 
individual players becomes expensive or difficult 
to measure relative to the value of productivity 
(again leading to paying below market value). In 
either case, performance will eventually suffer as 
either the firm acquiring the difficult-to-measure 
inputs or the buyer/coordinator of the inputs will 
reduce their level of effort to match their reward. 
Additionally, uncertainty may also lead to more 
market-based exchanges due to the increased 
flexibility in partner-selection (Rindfleisch & 
Heide, 1997).
Empirical evidence demonstrates mixed results 
regarding TCA’s predictions of the effects of 
uncertainty, probably largely due to the difficulty 
of measuring the construct (David & Han, 2004; 
Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Because uncertainty 
is a multidimensional construct, it is best studied 
via longitudinal or dynamic methods such as the 
current study that take into account factors such 
as environmental dynamism, environmental het-
erogeneity, and innovation. Any insights gathered 
with regard to uncertainty would be an important 
contribution.
TCA’s Exchange Factors
Two kinds of exchange factors appear in the 
model, derived from TCA’s exchange factors that 
predict the optimal interfirm governance form. 
Exchange factors include 1) frequency and 2) 
asset specificity.
Frequency
Generally speaking, as two firms conduct more 
exchanges with each other, they find more effi-
cient ways of conducting the exchanges, driving 
down the transaction costs on a per unit basis. 
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Frequency of transactions has different effects on 
the governance form depending on asset specificity 
and behavioral uncertainty. The costs of monitor-
ing behavior in close partnerships mean that as 
long as there is no behavioral uncertainty, open 
market transactions are very efficient. When the 
costs of motivating partners to align their interests 
outweigh the costs of more integrated forms of 
governance, then firms move away from open mar-
ket transactions. This insight suggests a U-shaped 
relationship between economies of scale and fre-
quency of transactions—relatively few players at 
the early and late stages of an industry’s life cycle 
mean fewer options for switching and more “lock 
in” leading to more frequent transactions between 
the remaining firms. During the highly competitive 
rapid growth phase, the appearance of many firms 
provides many opportunities to switch to a better 
partner, and less incentive to stick with the same 
partner, thus lowering frequency. Additionally, a 
rapid rate of technological advance forces firms 
to keep up with successful innovators or perish.
Asset Specificity
Asset specificity provides a means for limiting the 
effects of bounded rationality and technological 
uncertainty. By investing in resources customized 
for the specific conditions of exchange between 
two firms, more information becomes available for 
managerial decision making. Increased informa-
tion reduces the coordination costs between firms, 
as described under previously under bounded 
rationality (Garicano and Kaplan, 2001). In ad-
dition to reducing coordination costs between 
firms, asset specificity becomes desirable as a 
means of “locking in” sources of supply or buy-
ers in the presence of environmental turbulence 
for two reasons. Firstly, successful innovation 
flourishes under conditions of frequent interaction 
and interdependence between firms (Varadarajan 
& Cunningham, 1995); market transactions do 
not allow for interfirm learning and exchange of 
ideas, but asset specificity ensures closer or even 
exclusive relationships. Secondly, greater leaps in 
innovation increase the costs of failure while also 
increasing the incentives for achieving success 
(Chesbrough & Teece, 1996); increasing asset 
specificity reduces the risk to each firm while 
increasing the chances of successful innovation.
Shortcomings of TCA
As Williamson (2008) himself pointed out, TCE 
limits itself to individual transactions, rather than 
grouping transactions and considering them as 
part of a system. TCE represents essentially a 
contractual approach to explaining inter-firm 
transactions, which leads to several theoretical 
shortcomings (for a more detailed expose, see 
Deitrich, 2012). Overlooked in most current TCA 
scholarship is the importance of production factors. 
Coase’s (1937) original vision involved balancing 
the marginal contribution of owning production 
versus managing via exchanges on the open 
market. The balancing act occurs in “an outside 
network of relative prices and costs” (Coase, 1937: 
p. 389). It is a relatively recent development that 
firms now have the tools to actively manage this 
balancing act across multiple firms. The active 
collaboration across multiple firms in order to 
lower transaction costs or take advantage of lower 
external production costs is the essence of supply 
chain management.
The means of managing collaboration across 
multiple firms may vary from purely open market, 
one-time exchanges to exclusive, long-lasting 
relationships. These two classifications form the 
anchors for what has been described as a concep-
tually useful continuum of interfirm exchange 
governance from purely “transactional” to purely 
“relational” exchanges (Heide, 1994). In essence, 
transactional and relational exchanges offer differ-
ent strategies for cost tradeoffs between transaction 
and production costs (see Figure 1). Transactional 
exchanges make the explicit assumption that as 
a firm’s capacity grows it must deal with more 
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open market transactions, and transaction costs 
will eventually increase per unit as the result of 
having more trading partners whose needs must be 
tracked, and more information to be gathered and 
compared before making purchasing decisions, 
and generally increased costs of greater managerial 
scope. Relational exchanges limit interactions to 
one or very few trading partners, thus lowering 
transaction costs on a per unit basis as the result 
of greater efficiencies—analogous to economies 
of scale or learning curve effect, but applied to 
interfirm collaboration. At some point, produc-
tion will reach diseconomies of scale, raising unit 
production costs and ultimately raising total costs.
Despite a strong empirical record, TCA theo-
ry does suffer some drawbacks (Joshi and Camp-
bell, 2003). It lacks explanatory power for how 
firms organize themselves in a network then adapt 
their exchange behavior based upon changes to 
the production and demand environments. TCA 
has also been criticized for focusing on exogenous 
market factors and failing to explain firm-level 
decisions (Hunt and Morgan, 1995). As a theory 
of interfirm collaboration TCA suffers from being 
firm-centered (or at best dyadic) and static in 
nature (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997)—a far cry 
from the supply chain reality of networks with 
highly dynamic firm interactions. Recent theo-
retical work into complex adaptive systems offers 
a new paradigm for studying systems character-
ized by adaptive agents who repeatedly interact 
and adapt to their environment (Surana, et al., 
2005).
Adaptation in Supply Chains
Recently several new theoretical perspectives of 
supply chain management have been proposed that 
incorporate the complex adaptive systems (CAS) 
perspective (c.f., Mena, et al., 2013; Pilbeam, et 
al., 2012; Schoenherr, et al., 2011). CAS theory 
offers a way of studying supply chain networks of 
firms that adapt their behavior based upon experi-
ence and the outcomes of interactions (Choi, et 
al., 2001; Surana, et al., 2005; Vargo and Lusch, 
2004). Complex adaptive systems developed from 
Figure 1. Conceptualization of total cost curves for transactional and relational exchanges
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complexity science and arose out of the study of 
open systems. In the organizational context, a 
system consists of interconnected components that 
interact; such systems are “open” because they 
exchange resources with the environment. When 
the members of a system have many interactions 
that result in a whole that is interdependent with 
the environment, they comprise a complex system 
(Anderson, 1999). The idea of complex systems 
underlies Forrester’s (1958, 1961) dynamic models 
now commonly used as the bases for studying the 
beer game or the bullwhip effect in supply chain 
analysis (Lee, Padmanabhan, & Whang, 1997a; 
Lee, et al., 1997b).
Complex adaptive systems build on the idea 
that “adaptation builds complexity” (John H. 
Holland, 1995). In a CAS, members of a system 
are called entities (Surana, Kumara, Greaves, & 
Raghavan, 2005). Each entity communicates with 
other entities and the environment, accumulating 
experience (learning), continuously interacting, 
and changing its behavior, and its own structure 
as well as the system’s structure. The CAS per-
spective has been applied successfully for many 
years to the study of socio-economical processes, 
to include economics (J. H. Holland & Miller, 
1991; Limburg, O’Neill, Costanza, & Farber, 
2002; Markose, 2005), organizational learning 
(Chiva-Gomez, 2003; McElroy, 2000; Morel & 
Ramanujam, 1999), psychology (Dooley, 1997; 
Goldstone & Sakamoto, 2003), linguistics (Kirby, 
2000), anthropology (Abel, 1998), military strat-
egy (Ilachinski, 2000), innovation (Eisenhardt & 
Tabrizi, 1995), and strategy (Bettis & Prahalad, 
1995).
There are six characteristics that make the CAS 
paradigm particularly appropriate for the study of 
supply chains: 1) interactions, 2) interdependen-
cies, 3) high non-linearity, 4) self-organization, 
5) evolution, and 6) dynamism. Interestingly, 
CAS possess the most salient qualities that both 
Coase (1937) and Williamson (1991) ascribed 
to market exchanges: movement from one equi-
librium point to another, continuously dynamic, 
firm dependence on an outside network of other 
firms and prices, and made up of autonomous but 
not entirely independent actors. As such, the CAS 
paradigm offers a strong foundation for the study 
of supply chains as both markets and systems.
Complex adaptive systems theory describes 
increasingly complex networks as more expensive 
and fragile to maintain, but their diversity of struc-
tures provides greater robustness to environmental 
fluctuations. While the increased diversity and 
complexity of structures increase resilience in the 
face of random attacks or environmental shifts, 
they also increase vulnerability to targeted attacks 
or in the event that certain key system nodes suc-
cumb to environmental shifts (c.f., Holme, Kim, 
Yoon, & Han, 2002). This happens as the result 
of the high number of interactions that occur with 
certain key members of the system.
Supply Chain Evolution
“Evolution” as a word has become commonplace 
in contemporary society, so a precise definition 
is required for supply chain networks. Van de 
Ven and Poole (1995) provided perhaps the most 
cited definition in organizational studies for evo-
lution: “cumulative changes in structural forms 
of populations of organizational entities across 
communities” (p. 517-518). They further elaborate 
that, “evolution explains change as a recurrent, 
cumulative, and probabilistic progression of varia-
tion, selection, and retention of organizational 
entities” (Van De Ven & Poole, 1995, p. p. 518).
This definition suggests three primary pro-
cesses shape evolution: variation, selection, and 
retention. Variation creates novel forms of orga-
nizations. Selection results from the allocation 
or appropriation of scarce resources amongst 
competitors. Retention describes how certain orga-
nizational forms perpetuate. Figure 2 summarizes 
the conceptual relationships of evolutionary forces 
when a supply chain network is modeled as a CAS.
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Selection
From the perspective of supply chain evolution 
as interpreted via the TCA lens, the allocation or 
appropriation of scarce resources occurs via the 
choice of both the right trading partners and the 
right mode of conducting inter-firm exchanges. 
A dominant form of inter-firm governance can 
be referred to as a market information regime. 
Market information regimes arise as a way of 
making socially agreed upon information rou-
tinized and widely available in order to reduce 
market uncertainty (Anand & Peterson, 2000). 
Market information regimes provide a means of 
control for information asymmetries resulting 
from uncertainties in actions and intentions by 
competitors or trade partners (Heimer, 1985). 
Market information regimes make others’ actions 
more predictable, but in markets with powerful 
externalities such as a rapid rate of technological 
advance, they can become an obstacle as they 
routinize information that rapidly obsolesces or 
is otherwise overcome by events. Under these 
circumstances, larger companies often reduce their 
uncertainty by obligating another supply chain 
member to bear it (Heimer, 1985). Managers at 
the individual firm level cannot guarantee their 
exchange partners will continue to be the best 
trading partner into the future, and striking the 
right balance of commitment and flexibility in a 
relationship is a critical strategic decision. This 
translates into a problem of bounded rationality 
for the managers.
Evolution of interfirm collaboration implies 
change in firm relationships. This research ef-
fort refers to the selective force on supply chain 
relationships as transience. In order to measure 
transience in the simulation, a collaboration index 
was developed which kept track of the degree of 
permanence or loyalty of relationships in the sup-
ply chain network. Transience is defined as the 
inability to predict who exchange partners will be 
over time. High transience makes predicting who 
will be the future exchange partners for a given 
firm more difficult. As described subsequently, 
transience was assessed by maintaining a col-
Figure 2. Modeling framework
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laboration index which kept track of the degree 
of permanence or loyalty of relationships in the 
supply chain network.
Retention
Retention is defined as the continued existence 
of the same firms in a network and serves as the 
basis of stability in a supply chain network. De-
stabilizing effects that reduced longevity include 
a rapid pace of technology, volatility resulting 
from competition, mortality of partner firms, 
and switching of exchange partners. Retention 
is defined as the perpetuation of existing firms 
in the supply chain network and is measured as 
longevity of the individual firms and assessed 
using survival analysis.
Variation
Variation is the appearance of new combinations 
of firms that produce and distribute a final product 
co-exist in the supply chain network. Increased 
variation implies increased complexity of the sup-
ply chain network as both new firms and different 
forms of inter-firm governance rise and fall until 
more effective and efficient forms appear and 
are replicated. The extreme example of a supply 
chain network with low complexity is a single 
vertically integrated supply chain serving the 
entire end market. Increasingly complex supply 
chain networks exhibit more varieties of firms 
and wide variation in governance mechanisms 
between firms.
Complex adaptive systems theory describes 
increasingly complex networks as more expen-
sive and fragile to maintain, but their diversity 
of structures provides greater robustness to en-
vironmental fluctuations. The simulation inves-
tigated the resilience of more complex networks 
in heterogeneous environments characterized by 
a rapid rate of technological advance.
FRAMEWORK AND 
RESEARCH METHOD
This section describes the methodology, experi-
mental design, model validation and verification, 
and the statistical analysis. The supply chain mod-
eled consists of a manufacturer who originates 
most of the product innovations, an assembler, 
and a retailer who serves the end market (see 
Figure 3).The methodological roadmap provided 
by Davis, et al. (2007), while analogous to road-
maps provided in other simulation texts (Banks, 
II, & Nelson, 1999; Law & Kelton, 2000; Maisel 
& Gnugnoli, 1972), is tailored to the application 
of simulation to theory building and extension 
(Table 1). The introduction presented step 1 which 
identified the research question as, “How does 
interfirm collaboration evolve in a supply chain 
Figure 3. Basic supply chain
Table 1. Theory building roadmap 
Step
1. Begin with a research question
2. Identify simple theory
3. Choose a simulation approach
4. Create computational representation
5. Verify computational representation
6. Experiment to build novel theory
7. Validate with empirical data
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network under different product-market condi-
tions?” Step 2, identification of “simple theory,” 
appears as a literature review of transaction cost 
analysis, complex adaptive systems, and organi-
zational evolution theories. Steps 3 through 5 are 
described in the methods section. The outcomes of 
Step 6 appear in the results section. Step 7 consists 
of empirical validation and is beyond the scope 
of this paper; empirical validation appears as an 
area of future research.
Figure 4 presents the simulation framework 
(for a more complete description of the simulation 
model, see Appendix A). It synthesizes the inter-
relationships of the simulation variables in order 
to extend TCA theory into a dynamic network 
environment by using the CAS paradigm. A brief 
description of the predicted relationships follows.
Simulation Approach
Simulation models have studied supply chains 
as complex adaptive systems using the systems 
dynamics approach (Akkermans, 2001; Kim, 
2003; Lin, Huang, & Lin, 2002; Parunak, 1998; 
Pathak, 2005). Past researchers have used an agent-
based approach to study how markets consisting 
of semi-autonomous entities self-organize in a 
way that characterizes complex adaptive systems. 
The systems dynamics approach to simulation 
was used. It is useful when research focuses 
on the influence of causal relationships among 
constructs on the behavior of the system (Davis, 
et al., 2007) and allows the researcher to specify 
several simple processes with circular causal-
ity—such as lower price leading to higher sales, 
Figure 4. Simulation framework
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which provides positive feedback to lower price 
again. These processes of circular causality also 
intersect with other constructs. For example, lower 
prices may result from increased economies of 
scale. The simple theories underlying the modeling 
framework dictate the sources of stochasticity in 
the modeled system.
Experimental Design
A full factorial experimental design was imple-
mented with a 2 x 3 x 2 experimental design 
consisting of two levels of capacity cost (high 
vs. low), three levels of consumer end markets 
(heterogeneous or homogeneous with high and 
low price sensitivity), and two levels of rate of 
technological change (rapid vs. slow), with a 
total of 12 experiments. In order to achieve an 
adequate sample size for each experiment, an n 
of 30 simulations runs was selected, making for 
a total of 360 samples.
Exogenous Factors
The exogenous factors in the simulation were the 
per unit cost, demand curve, capacity utilization 
threshold, capacity upgrade decision threshold, 
starting life points (for firm “health”), and the rate 
at which firm health degrades or improves in the 
face of poor or strong performance.
Per unit cost was the outcome of economies of 
scale and transaction costs. Inefficient use of ca-
pacity caused firms to die off. Increasing capacity 
utilization increased firm health and opportunity 
to increase capacity. Health was indicated by life 
points assigned to each firm. Exceptional capac-
ity utilization increased life points. Low capacity 
utilization reduced life points and also reduced 
the likelihood of increasing capacity. When life 
points reached zero, the company was marked 
inactive to indicate that it had “died.” Companies 
also gained production expertise over time as 
reflected by lowering cost per unit as a function 
of experience tied to company age.
Unfulfilled demand spawned the process of 
firm birth. A new firm formed when there was 
enough unfulfilled demand to support it. As the 
result of a demand curve with rapid early growth, 
many births appeared early in the simulation. When 
each company was created it started at the aver-
age capacity of other firms of the same type and 
would elect either a high quality or a low quality 
strategy. High quality strategy meant harvesting 
higher prices but lower production and lower 
optimum economy of scale; low quality strategy 
meant the converse. When confronted with a 
small price differential for high and low quality 
products, consumers preferred the high quality 
product. Prices for both high and low quality 
products decreased linearly over time, but price for 
low quality products decreased more rapidly. As 
the quality differential between the two classes of 
products diminished, more customers will prefer 
savings over a high quality product.
Demand recreated the product life cycle with 
volume following a normal curve, with rapid 
demand growth followed by decline. A stochastic 
element was implemented to emulate random 
demand fluctuation. The simulation started with 
a dozen firms at each level of the supply chain. 
At the beginning these firms practiced exclusive 
relationships with one buyer and one supplier. 
Growing demand prompted the appearance of 
new firms; when demand diminished, firms were 
forced out of business.
Dependent Variables
Retention was measured as the longevity, in simu-
lation time steps, of individual firms, and analyzed 
via survival analysis, a specialized form of The 
dependent variable was the collaboration index, 
as previously described in detail.
The collaboration index was a scaled variable 
(from 0 to 1) that described the exchange behavior 
for a given company in terms of how exclusive 
the relationships are that the company maintains 
with its buyers or suppliers. If E(x,y) represented 
344
Evolution of Supply Chain Collaboration
the total number of units sold by company x to 
company y, E was approximately the product of 
the number of exchanges that occurred and the 
number of units sold per exchange (x times y). If 
Ii represented the collaboration index, then the 





























where n is the number of companies j with whom 
company i does business.
The collaboration index provides a single 
measure of both the magnitude and duration of 
the relationship between company x and buyers 
or suppliers y. This means that a manufacturer 
would only have one collaboration index for all 
of its relationships with its downstream buyers, 
but assemblers had separate collaboration indices 
for their suppliers and their buyers.
This formulation for a collaboration index had 
the interesting property that for n equal companies 
that company x did business with, the collaboration 
index would be 1/n. This may be demonstrated 
by assuming that for n equal companies that all 


































The reciprocal of the collaboration index had 
the interesting property of equaling the approxi-
mate number of companies that were company 
x’s primary suppliers or buyers. In other words, a 
simple calculation that estimates a “virtual number 
of companies” that company i does business with 
may be calculated by simply taking 1/Ii.
Time-series analysis was used to assess the 
processes of evolution of exchange governance 
(Pathak, 2005; Surana, et al., 2005). In this section, 
analyses of the experimental results are presented 
in several stages with regard to their evolutionary 
implications. Thirty runs of 1,000 time steps were 
made of each of the 12 experimental scenarios. 
The resulting 3,600,000 data points (300,000 per 
experiment) provided a rich dataset for analysis.
Proportional time series analysis assessed tran-
sience as reflected by the evolution of interfirm 
relationships using the collaboration index. First, 
the simulation was divided into 5 time steps of 
200 demand cycles each based upon the stages 
of the product life cycle (Figure 5). Operational-
ization of selection was based on changes to the 
collaboration index. Using PROC GLM in SAS, 
simple univariate analysis created 95% confidence 
intervals of the collaboration index at each time 
step. Binary encoding based upon statistically 
significant changes to the collaboration index 
between successive time periods was the basis for 
classifying as unstable, with a 1 indicating that a 
statistically significant change had occurred from 
one time step to the next and a 0 indicating that no 
statistically significant change to the collaboration 
index had occurred. Then a technique frequently 
applied to this type of analysis (Fokianos & 
Kedem, 2003)—Agresti’s (1990) multinomial 
logit model—was used to analyze the series of 
encoded 1’s and 0’s.
RESULTS
In this section, analyses of the experimental re-
sults are presented in several stages with regard 
to their evolutionary implications. Thirty runs 
of 1,000 time steps were made of each of the 12 
experimental scenarios. The resulting 3,600,000 
data points (300,000 per experiment) provided a 
rich dataset for analysis.
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First, time series analysis provide insight 
into processes of variation, describing types of 
firms and strategies that propagated in the dif-
ferent supply chain network scenarios. Second, 
general linear models and survival analysis of 
firm longevity were used to assess retention of 
firms under different experimental conditions. 
Third, proportional time series analysis assessed 
selection as reflected by the evolution of interfirm 
relationships using the collaboration index.
Variation
Analysis of variation was conducted by use of dif-
ferencing and generalized linear modeling (GLM). 
Differencing was a special case of time series 
analysis based on the difference in the number 
of firms between the current and the previous 
time steps (i.e., a positive difference indicates an 
increase in the number of firms). Differencing 
commonly appears as a way of focusing on change 
in time series analysis of non-stationary processes 
(Granger & Newbold, 1977; Nelson, 1973). The 
GLM procedure in SAS version 9.1 was used to 
model the differencing scores as the dependent 
variable with time and strategy as the independent 
variables individually for each experiment except 
the homogeneous high price scenarios in which 
no low price firms were spawned. All the GLM 
models returned significant overall F-scores. 
Table 2 displays the parameter estimates and their 
significance for manufacturers, assemblers, and 
retailers across all 12 experiments. Time cycles 
were divided by 1000 to put it closer to the same 
relative scale as the average differences.
A significant parameter estimate for time in-
dicates that differences increased over time—ei-
ther the number of firms increased at first than 
Figure 5. Demand volume curve
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decreased over time (negative parameter estimate), 
or it decreased at first then increased (positive 
parameter estimate). A zero (statistically non-
significant) time estimate indicated that there was 
no trend in the differencing over time—in other 
words, neither proliferation nor diminishment 
occurs systematically. In this last situation, a trend 
of variation was not occurring, compared to the 
situation of a significant parameter estimate in-
dicating that a trend of variation was occurring. 
Overall, variation appears to depend strongly on 
end market conditions. Presentation of experi-
mental results are grouped by end market sce-
narios.
Heterogeneous Demand 
(Experiments 1 through 4)
Analysis of the parameter estimation results of the 
variation analysis for manufacturers and retailers 
revealed statistically significant parameter esti-
mates for time, strategy and the interaction term. 
Additionally, for both manufacturers and retailers, 
the parameter estimates for all four experiments 
were negative for the effect of time while they were 
positive for the effect of strategy. A negative slope 
on the time estimate indicated that the number of 
firms grow then decrease until it becomes negative, 
at which point firms begin dying out. The positive 
strategy parameter estimates indicated that the 
differencing for the high price firms cross zero 
Table 2. Variation analysis results 
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later than for low price firms—initial population 
growth was faster for high price firms, but so was 
later population decline.
The interactive effect was significant and 
negative for manufacturers and retailers for all 
four experiments. High price firms experience 
relatively greater negative population growth 
over the course of the simulation compared to 
low price firms. Overall, this paints a picture for 
heterogeneous end markets prompting growth 
early in the simulation for both low and high 
price firms. After demand peaks, the number of 
both high and low price firms declined, but much 
more so for high price firms. The magnitude of 
the parameter estimates indicated by the slopes 
of the differences from time step to time step, 
and thus were commensurate with the amount 
of growth then decline. Since manufacturers and 
retailers each had the same starting populations, 
the greater parameter estimates suggested that 
retailers propagated to a higher population than 
manufacturers before rapidly dying out.
Assemblers had statistically significant nega-
tive parameter estimates for time and strategy, but 
once the interaction term was added strategy lost 
its significance. These results describe a life cycle 
for assemblers of initial growth that eventually 
diminish in keeping with the pattern of demand 
growth and shrinkage. High price assemblers 
gradually declined in population over the course 
of the simulation, the population of low price 
manufacturers gradually increased to serve the 
burgeoning low price market. The lack of sig-
nificance for the interaction term indicated that 
assembler population does not have a significant 
growth-then-decline like manufacturers and retail-
ers—instead, the total population of assemblers 
remained relatively steady as the population of 
high price assemblers declined while low price 
assemblers proliferated.
Homogeneous High Demand 
(Experiments 5 through 8)
All four experiments with a homogeneous high 
price demonstrated statistically significant nega-
tive parameter estimates for time for all three 
firm types. This indicated that all firms profligate 
rapidly at first with a steady decline in the rate 
of population growth followed by an increasing 
loss in population from time step to time step. 
The parameter estimates indicated the greatest 
variation (magnitude) for retailers and the least 
for assemblers. Assemblers apparently enjoy some 
benefit from being in the middle of the supply 
chain—retailers face the brunt of variability in 
demand, and manufacturers were impacted by 
variation in the success of their products, but 
assemblers feel these effects only secondarily. 
Since the population of manufacturers and retail-
ers buffers the volatility of end market demand, 
assemblers only have to respond to their buyer 
and supplier markets.
Homogeneous Low Demand 
(Experiments 9 through 12)
For all firm types in all four experiments with 
a homogeneous low price demand setting, sig-
nificant negative parameter estimates resulted 
for time and strategy. Introducing the interactive 
term reduced the overall R-square and resulted 
in a non-significant strategy coefficient. Based 
on this evidence, the simpler model was retained.
The parameter estimates for retailers exhibited 
the greatest magnitude for both time and strategy. 
This revealed that retailers exhibit the greatest 
increase at the beginning followed by greater 
declines in numbers of retailers. The negative 
value for strategy indicated that as high strategy 
firms begin to decline in numbers, low strategy 
firms increase in numbers. This relationship was 
relatively stronger for retailers than it was for 
manufacturers and retailers. The lack of a signifi-
cant interaction term indicated that the increasing 
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rate of population growth for low price firms does 
not change during the course of the simulation.
Retention
Since the supply chain network under study 
evolved over time, retention was assessed using 
parametric survival analysis since it specifically 
measured the time-dependence (Harrell, 2001). 
SAS 9.1 was used to conduct all retention analy-
ses. Survival analysis addresses the positively 
skewed distribution of time to occurrence of an 
event and supplies a probability of surviving past 
a given time, which was often more useful than 
an expected lifespan. Analytical results of firm 
longevity are summarized in Table 3.
Rate of Technological Advance
Under conditions of rapid technological advance-
ment manufacturers and assemblers displayed 11% 
and 12% reductions in longevity, respectively. 
Markets characterized by rapid technological 
advancement also reduced retailer longevity by a 
statistically significant but small (<3%) amount; 
otherwise rate of technological advance demon-
strated no significant effect on retailers. These 
results followed intuitive expectations since manu-
facturer production capacity served as the starting 
point for technological advances in the supply 
chain, and assemblers relied on a small number 
of manufacturers. Assemblers choosing poorly 
found their suppliers going out of business. The 
Table 3. Longevity parameter estimates by experiment 
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strength of relationship with manufacturers and 
retailers also contributed to assembler longevity. 
As discussed subsequently, retailer longevity was 
more influenced by economies of scale.
For manufacturers price strategy (high vs. low 
quality product) exhibited a strong influence on 
longevity regardless of the rate of technological 
advance, with manufacturers following the high 
price strategy displaying significantly greater 
longevity. Assemblers following a high price 
strategy under conditions of fast rate of techno-
logical advance and homogeneous, low price end 
markets exhibited 39% and 53% greater longevity, 
respectively, than low price assemblers in response 
to fast and slow increases to economies of scale. 
This counterintuitive result was the outcome of 
intense inter-firm competition among low-price 
strategy firms prompted by rapid growth in that 
market; stagnant growth of the high end market 
resulted in stable conditions that allowed high end 
assemblers to persist. Under conditions of slow 
rate of technological advance and growth of econo-
mies of scale, the slow pace of change made for a 
relatively small difference in longevity for high vs. 
low price strategy assemblers. Assemblers lived 
longer in environments with homogeneous pools 
of suppliers and buyers; if existing manufacturers 
and retailers switched assemblers or went out of 
business, assemblers benefited from having more 
substitutes available.
Economies of Scale
Rapidly growing economies of scale prompted 
statistically significant increases to longevity for 
all three firm types with 9%, 7.5%, and 18.7% 
greater longevity, respectively, for manufactur-
ers, assemblers, and retailers. Under conditions 
of rapid demand growth and rapidly increasing 
economies of scale, larger companies achieved 
lower production costs and the additional stabil-
ity resulting from serving larger market shares. 
Retailers that invested in greater capacity also 
benefited from additional demand stability of 
having larger market share.
Analysis of the individual experimental results, 
economies of scale had a similar positive effect 
on longevity for manufacturers across all experi-
mental conditions. For assemblers, the high price 
strategy related positively to increased longevity 
for the heterogeneous end market when the rate of 
increase of economies of scale was high (longev-
ity for these assemblers was 13-14% greater); this 
effect was even greater for the homogeneous low 
price end market with a fast rate of technologi-
cal advance (where high price assemblers lived 
53% longer). Parametric regression results were 
statistically non-significant for assemblers in both 
a homogeneous low price end and heterogeneous 
markets with a slow rate of technological advance.
Economies of scale exhibited a strong effect 
on retailers. For heterogeneous and homogeneous, 
low price markets, conditions of fast-paced in-
crease of economies of scale increased longevity 
of retailers following a high price strategy (from 
11-29%). The exception was under conditions of a 
homogeneous low price end market with a fast rate 
of technological advance, results of which did not 
achieve statistical significance. Slowly increasing 
economies of scale factor provoked the opposite 
effect, reducing longevity of high price retailers 
by 29-34% compared to low-price retailers serving 
either heterogeneous or homogeneous low price 
end markets. Compared to low price retailers, the 
high price retailers failed to establish a stable pool 
of end market demand to survive fluctuations and 
competition. These results reflect the real-life 
consequence of economies of scale where under 
the right conditions large retailers quickly drive 
small retailers out of business.
Selection
When examining the results of the experiments, it 
was important to keep in mind that all experiments 
started with 10 firms at each level of the supply 
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chain, each with one-on-one, exclusive relation-
ships with suppliers and customers, and all firms 
dedicated to serving the high end market. Results 
are discussed for each end market condition.
Analysis of the evolutionary process of selec-
tion was implemented with binary encoding. The 
thousand time cycle duration of the simulation 
was divided into 5 time steps of 200 demand 
cycles each. Simple univariate analysis (via PROC 
GLM in SAS) was used to create 95% confidence 
intervals of the collaboration index for each time 
step. Successive time steps were assessed for 
significant changes to the collaboration index, 
with a 1 encoding indicating that a statistically 
significant change had occurred from one time 
step to the next; a 0 indicated no significant time 
change had occurred, and therefore evolution of 
the exchange relationships had remained stable. 
The series of 1’s and 0’s were then analyzed us-
ing a multinomial logit model defined by Agresti 
(1990) and frequently used for this type of analysis 
(Fokianos & Kedem, 2003). Table 4 presents a 
Table 4. Significant trends in inter-firm collaboration 
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simplified depiction of the trends in inter-firm 
collaboration for each of the exchange relationship 
perspectives between manufacturers, assemblers, 
and retailers. Inter-firm collaborations evolved 
differently depending on the level in the supply 
chain, the product price strategy, and the rate of 
technological advance. Only variables that dem-
onstrated statistically significant effects appear in 
Table 4; complete results appear in Appendix B.
Heterogeneous End Market
High price strategy perpetuated strong inter-firm 
collaborations across most interfirm exchanges 
throughout the demand life cycle. A shrinking 
high end market meant a shrinking pool of high 
end businesses with whom to conduct exchanges; 
surviving firms were those with a history of strong 
collaboration. The exception was the assembler-
to-retailer relationship, which exhibited trend of 
diminishing collaboration throughout the demand 
life cycle until leveling off at late decline. This 
contrasts with unchanging retailer-to-assembler 
collaboration, indicating that even as assemblers 
expanded market opportunities, retailers stayed 
with established suppliers.
The rapid growth of a low end market prompted 
much more evolution of inter-firm collaboration 
for companies following the low price strategy 
with a slow pace of technological advance. Low 
price manufacturers exhibited a decline in col-
laboration during the transition to rapid growth, 
but thereafter remained unchanged. Low price 
assemblers exhibited little change in the collabo-
ration index throughout the life of the simulation 
for their relationships with manufacturers. On the 
sell-side, low price assemblers appear to expand 
their markets as indicated by a declining col-
laboration index throughout most of simulation 
until late decline, when collaboration intensifies 
with the remaining retailers. Retailers on the other 
hand exhibited increasing collaboration as demand 
progressed to the growth and maturity stages, and 
then declining collaboration during the stages of 
declining demand. Retailers were forced to prolong 
supplier relationships when demand outstripped 
supply, but were more likely to switch suppliers 
as increasingly price sensitive customers declined 
in number relative to available supply.
High rate of technological advance exhibited 
a significant effect only for the buying side of 
interfirm relationships for low price companies. 
Assembler-to-manufacturer relationships dem-
onstrated increased collaboration into both the 
growth and maturity stages, with declining col-
laboration thereafter. During the first half of the 
simulation, manufacturing capacity trailed end 
market demand, leading assemblers to leverage 
collaborative relationships to ensure a source 
of supply. Retailer-to-assembler collaboration 
initially declined as demand entered the growth 
phase, then increased during maturity, remaining 
level thereafter. In conjunction with the analysis 
on variation and retention, this indicates that 
under conditions of rapid technological advance 
that low price retailers at first struggled to find 
enough sources of supply to satisfy demand, with 
surviving retailers strengthening the relationships 
discovered during the growth phase which offered 
the benefit of reduced prices to the end consumer.
Homogeneous Low Price Demand
Homogeneous low price end market demand led 
to the same evolutionary path for interfirm col-
laboration for three out of four of supply chain rela-
tionships which exhibited declining collaboration 
throughout the simulation until remaining steady 
during the transition from early to late decline. 
High price manufacturers were the exception to 
this pattern as they exhibited unchanged collabo-
ration indices throughout the demand life cycle.
Low price supply chains exhibited different 
evolutionary trajectories depending generally on 
whether firms are selling or buying. Manufacturers 
initially increased collaboration with assemblers, 
and then decreased collaboration for the rest of 
the demand life cycle. Assemblers decreased 
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collaboration with retailers until the late decline 
stage when the collaboration index increased. 
On the sell-side, low price assemblers exhibited 
decreasing collaboration with retailers through 
growth, maturity, and early decline followed by an 
increase to collaboration during late decline. Low 
price companies exhibited a common pattern of 
evolution for buying side collaboration. Assem-
bler-to-manufacturer and retailer-to-assembler 
collaboration increased during the growth phase, 
then decreased at maturity and remained steady 
until decreasing again at late decline.
Homogeneous High Price Demand
The experimental conditions of homogeneous, 
high end market demand prompted the appear-
ance of additional numbers of firms to satisfy 
growing demand, but failed to prompt evolution 
of interfirm collaboration, as would be expected 
under conditions of low environmental pressure. 
Firms appear to maintain their exclusive ties, and 
the greater expense of expanding or upgrading 
capacity for high end product meant a slower pace 
of growth at the firm level; it also meant that ag-
gregate production capacity continuously lagged 
end market demand. Firms maintained exclusive 
relationships under this setting largely due to the 
lack of available trading partners with unclaimed 
output, and lack of competitive pressures meant 
low mortality rates.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE IN 
SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORKS
Business literature may be re-orienting toward 
a dominant logic founded on collaboration and 
knowledge as the sources of competitive advan-
tage (Vargo and Lusch, 2004a; Inkpen and Tsang, 
2005; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004; McEvily and 
Chakravarthy, 2002; Kogut, 2000). For example, 
in marketing Service-Dominant Logic (Vargo 
and Lusch, 2004b) posits that knowledge, and 
the knowledge processes surrounding products 
and product management, are key sources of 
competitive advantage (Lusch and Vargo, 2006; 
Vargo and Lusch, 2004a). In essence, rather than 
focus on its physical properties and features, the 
product embodies the knowledge and collabora-
tive abilities of all those who contributed to its 
creation. Furthermore, “...knowledge as the basis 
for competitive advantage can be extended to the 
entire supply chain” (Vargo and Lusch, 2004b, p. 
9). In this view, knowledge exchange underlies 
successful organizational and collaborative forms.
But not all knowledge is the same, and different 
forms of collaboration will interact to affect the 
value and outcomes of inter-organizational knowl-
edge management. What follows are propositions 
regarding how the evolution of inter-organizational 
collaboration will affect or be affected by the 
different roles of knowledge in the supply chain: 
knowledge generation, knowledge sharing, and 
knowledge implementation (Gravier, et., 2008). 
Some empirical research supports these proposi-
tions, but in the absence of a predictive theory 
for the role of knowledge in inter-organizational 
supply chains, it is hoped that these propositions 
can provide some insights or guide future research.
Much of the literature included derives from 
the work in strategic alliances, which is rooted 
in the premise that firms collaborate in order to 
access the knowledge and competences of other 
firms. But not all accessions of knowledge are 
created equal. Hamel distinguished “internalizing” 
as opposed to merely “accessing” knowledge 
endemic to another firm (Hamel, 1991). Real-life 
challenges to inter-organizational collaborations 
lead to a “collaborative membrane” that acts as 
a filter between organizations in alliances. The 
collaborative membrane can profoundly influence 
the magnitude, content, and direction of inter-
organizational knowledge flows. In effect, the 
collaborative membrane defines the collaborative 
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relationship that exists between alliance (and sup-
ply chain) members. Based upon these insights, 
inter-organizational interaction falls into one of 
two approaches to inter-organizational interac-
tion: collaboration (“internalizing” knowledge) 
or modularization (“accessing” knowledge). 
The underlying premise rests on the assumption 
that the role that inter-organizational knowledge 
plays determines the degree of collaboration or 
modularity in the supply chain (see Figure 6).
Collaboration
Kahn’s (1996) research into integration equated 
“collaboration” with continuous interaction, often 
informal in nature, most often without clearly 
defined structure. Collaboration attains collective 
goals via resource sharing and a common vision. 
Collaboration would represent the outcomes of 
long-term relationships characterized by trust and 
many interactions (a high collaboration index in 
the previously described simulation) Collabora-
tion buffers volatility for firms in highly unstable 
environments, which enhances the opportunity to 
learn-by-doing (Sorenson, 2003). Collaboration 
characterizes well-functioning alliances but also 
many high-performing supply chains whose firms 
depend upon each other and interact frequently and 
effectively. Supply chain integration approaches 
such as vested outsourcing (Vitasek, 2011) and 
performance-based logistics (Randall, et al., 2010) 
increase collaboration.
Collaboration benefits supply chains with 
operations characterized by more complex interac-
tions. Products involving optimization of highly 
interdependent or complex interdependencies of 
design and manufacture, or diverse design choices 
(such as a microprocessor), tend to benefit more 
from collaboration.
Modularity
Modularity represents a strong focus on the indi-
viduality of each firm and less inter-operational 
dependence (represented by lower levels of the 
collaboration index in this study’s simulation). 
Traditional contract-based outsourcing represent 
one possible outcome of modular supply chains, 
although modularity also includes discrete or-
ganizational nodes or clusters held together by 
standards of member performance and confor-
mance to design rules (Langlois, 2002). Modular 
supply chain architectures lower transaction costs 
while preserving the independent identities of 
the firms (Kahn, 1996). For many supply chains, 
modularity offers benefits over collaborations as 
Figure 6. Role of knowledge in determining degree of interfirm collaboration
354
Evolution of Supply Chain Collaboration
it allows redundant parallel operations by several 
network members, thereby improving speed and 
efficiency (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004). Com-
pared to a collaborative supply chain with sole 
sourcing or a reduced supplier base, modularity 
has the potential to reduce idle time, prompting 
more completed work in the same amount of time 
compared to situations where the same operations 
are all conducted by one or a small number of firms.
Modularity most benefits supply chains that 
provide modular products with limited diversity 
that have independent markets for each of the 
modules; such markets also benefit from the 
recombinant possibilities endemic to these sup-
ply chains.
Computer memory represents one supply chain 
that benefits from modularity. Computer memory 
has many applications in a variety of electronic 
products, both for consumers and as components 
for more complex assemblies such as automobiles 
or aircraft. On the other hand, supply chains that 
require frequent or complex interactions, such as 
testing and integrating new product innovations, 
bring to light the difficulties of optimizing highly 
interdependent processes in a modular network 
(Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004).
Knowledge Generation
In keeping with the knowledge problem-solving 
perspective of the knowledge-based theory of the 
firm (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004), and also with 
the information acquisition views of Rindfleisch 
and Moorman (2001), knowledge generation 
focuses on the acquisition of information that per-
tains directly to the development of new products 
or services. Knowledge generation in its various 
guises such as new product development and 
process innovation has a well-established record 
for boosting firm performance (c.f., Sethi et al., 
2001; Kohli and Jaworski, 1993). Research has 
also found evidence of knowledge generation’s 
effectiveness at developing new products in the 
inter-organizational context (Rindfleisch and 
Moorman, 2001; Sivadas and Dwyer, 2000; Im 
and Workman, 2004).
Inter-organizational knowledge generation 
could benefit from either modular or collaborative 
knowledge exchanges. For example, alliances have 
been called “...the most important source of new 
ideas and information that result in performance-
enhancing technology and innovations” (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998, p. 665). Evidence indicates that close 
inter-organizational collaborations in alliances 
bolsters innovation generation (Roy et al., 2004; 
Nielsen, 2005). However, intra-firm technologi-
cal and strategic flexibility capabilities may limit 
the benefits of inter-organizational collaborations 
(Zhou and Wu, 2010). Specifically, at the intra-
firm level, technological capability can create 
“lock-in” or path dependencies. An inverted-U 
relationship appears to define technological 
capability’s influence on innovation (Zhou and 
Wu, 2010), with too little technological capability 
resulting in a firm incapable of taking advantage 
of opportunities, and too much technological 
capability impeding adaptability. This evidence 
jibes with this study’s simulation findings. The 
collaboration index increased most in situations 
of intense innovation and diminishing profit 
margins—two powerful real-life motivators to 
collaborate innovatively. Among the requirements 
for successful intra-organizational innovative-
ness are flexibility and departures from planned 
objectives; both of these factors destabilize close 
relationships (Sivadas and Dwyer, 2000). These 
observations lead to the following proposition 
(see Figure 7):
P1: The degree of knowledge generation will 
demonstrate a U-shaped relationship with 
inter-organizational knowledge exchanges, 
with the highest need for knowledge gen-
eration leading to optimal rather than 
maximal levels of collaboration.
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This proposition implies that the most innova-
tive knowledge-exchanges will not be the closest 
collaborations, nor the arm’s-length transactions, 
but rather the hybrid forms that blend the benefits 
of each of the extremes, especially the flexibility to 
change partners if necessary. In keeping with the 
simulation’s findings, recent empirical work tends 
to support that close collaborations disintegrate 
less often from their failures and more often from 
the desirability of finding other partners (Greve, 
et al., 2012). On the surface, this proposition ap-
pears to fly in the face of common wisdom, but 
the high failure rate for strategic alliances implies 
that at worst close collaborations are useful only 
so long as they serve a purpose, and at best the 
benchmark organizations strive to enter alternative 
inter-organizational relationships that provide the 
benefits of alliances while minimizing impacts 
on flexibility.
Knowledge Sharing
Knowledge sharing leverages information sys-
tems and other to support sharing resources, 
competencies, personnel and other knowledge 
resources already possessed by at least one alli-
ance member but not by at least one other (Baker 
and Sinkula, 1999; Kohli and Jaworski, 1993). 
Also known as knowledge transfer or interfirm 
learning, knowledge sharing refers to the extent 
that organizations are able to access each other’s 
established know-how and critical information 
(Appleyard, 1996).
Distinct from knowledge generation, knowl-
edge sharing merely accesses knowledge rather 
than internalizing it across the inter-organizational 
collaborative membrane (Hamel, 1991). Knowl-
edge sharing of course generally occurs in many 
instances of organizational learning and other 
forms of knowledge generation (Roper and Crone, 
2003; Appleyard, 1996). However, as a process, 
knowledge sharing represents the antithesis of 
knowledge generation, focusing on information 
sharing rather than mutual learning and creation 
of new knowledge (Rindfleisch and Moorman, 
2001; Dyer and Singh, 1998).
Knowledge sharing often consists of hori-
zontal alliances seeking to reduce environmental 
uncertainty (Bucklin and Sengupta, 1993). One 
example is SEMATECH, a group of semiconduc-
tor manufacturing firms that shares information 
for the purposes of setting standards and tracking 
industry trends. The semiconductor firms also 
notoriously guard their secrets with regard to in-
novations to both process and product.
Figure 7. Graphical representation of the proposed relationships between role of knowledge and supply 
chain collaboration
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Research has linked the sharing of knowledge 
at the organization level with higher short-term 
financial benefit (Moorman and Miner, 1997). 
Sharing complementary knowledge resources on 
supplier or customer markets can prove beneficial 
and may lead to competitive advantage; indeed, 
that knowledge sharing may constitute the primary 
advantage that firms accrue through alliances and 
close collaborations (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 
2004). Toyota’s production supply chain is often 
cited as an example of a knowledge sharing net-
work (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000).
Importantly, one study has found that knowl-
edge sharing can have different effects on in-
novation depending on the breadth vs. depth of 
knowledge. Firms with a broad knowledge base 
tend not to benefit as much from external knowl-
edge sharing, whereas firms with a deep knowledge 
base tend to benefit from sharing information 
externally (Zhou and Li, 2012). This follows the 
insights from this study’s simulation that revealed 
that collaborations tend to be asymmetric, with 
firms such as retailers and assemblers with little 
need to innovate tending to collaborate more. 
On the other hand, firms such as manufacturers 
that need to innovate a lot tend not to collaborate 
outside of their boundaries. This and the previous 
observations lead to the following proposition:
P2: The degree of knowledge sharing will dem-
onstrate an increasing relationship with 
inter-organizational knowledge exchanges, 
with more knowledge sharing leading to 
more collaboration.
Knowledge Implementation
The implicit and explicit costs associated with 
Generating and sharing knowledge generates 
certain costs and require varying levels of com-
mitment and action on the part of the participat-
ing organizations. In order to avoid these costs 
or commitments, organizations may exercise the 
option to delegate certain activities to another 
organization (Kogut and Zander, 1992). Firms 
that elect to divest themselves of a non-core com-
petence are putting knowledge implementation to 
use (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). In supply chains, 
logistics knowledge frequently falls into the role of 
knowledge implementation, as evidenced by the 
rise of third party (3PL) and fourth party (4PL) 
logistics providers. As an example of knowledge 
exchanges occurring purely to allow another orga-
nization implement what they know how to do best, 
the latest evidence indicates that 3PL providers 
often coordinate not just logistics but all supply 
chain functions, allowing firms to focus on their 
core competences (Zacharia, et al., 2011). Firms 
avoid knowledge sharing with a logistics partner 
because of the volume of information that must be 
shared on package contents, origins, destinations, 
truck license number, air cargo flight numbers, 
shipping costs, hazardous material routing and 
the like, which generally requires that expensive 
information systems be developed for activities 
that occur outside of the firm. 3PLs and other 
logistics service providers function as “turnkey” 
service providers.
Knowledge implementation benefits both par-
ties most when their knowledge requirements are 
relatively self-sufficient and independent. Firms 
add value when they implement or execute spe-
cialized knowledge, processes, and capabilities. 
The complexities of modern products and services 
often rely on recombinatorial capabilities with 
many components in a way that often becomes 
exceedingly complex; increasingly, firms rely on 
outside specialists to make subcomponents or pro-
vide specialty services as housing all production 
under one roof has become not just intractably 
complex but economically untenable. Just imag-
ine trying to manage all the manufacturing for a 
common and relatively simple consumer product 
such as a cell phone, which involves more than 
18 subassemblies (not including software) and a 
minimum of a dozen manufacturers across at least 
seven countries—and this list does not include 
many manufacturers nor any ancillary service 
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providers (such as 3PLs) (Economist, 2011). More 
complex supply chains such as for automobile, 
pharmaceutical, medical equipment, and aircraft 
quickly become much more complicated.
Knowledge implementation benefit inter-
organizational networks by enhancing execution 
or consolidating common knowledge and expertise 
in order to pool risk and reduce investment in ad-
ditional production capacity or processes (Roper 
and Crone, 2003). Knowledge implementation 
focuses on efficiency rather than creating or ac-
cessing knowledge. The outcome is compartmen-
talized knowledge in the supply chain, but done 
in such a way that certain processes and services 
are readily provided, as required.
Knowledge implementation embodies the 
strategic blending of the unique capabilities of 
each organization in the network (Kogut and 
Zander, 1992). Creating new inter-organizational 
outcomes depends on mixing and matching firms, 
and the reliance on architectural capabilities at the 
interfirm level (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). 
For example, Microsoft produces its eponymous 
office software for both Apple and the PC market. 
Despite the importance of the software to the us-
ability of their final products, neither Apple nor 
Dell need to interact heavily with Microsoft; rather 
they simply purchase Microsoft’s finished product 
and related services “ready to go.” By facilitat-
ing economies of scale and compartmentalized 
competence, knowledge implementation enables 
leveraging the broader capabilities throughout the 
supply chain.
In the context of the earlier presented simula-
tion, under experimental treatments of rapidly 
expanding markets collaboration declined rapidly, 
especially under scenarios of low price elasticity. 
Low price elasticity meant little incentive to in-
novate or collaborate, and with a rapidly growing 
market firms shopped from any source in order 
to meet demand. These insights lead to the fol-
lowing proposition:
P3: The degree of knowledge implementation 
will demonstrate a negative relationship with 
inter-organizational knowledge exchanges, 
with more reliance on knowledge implemen-
tation leading to less collaboration.
CONCLUSION
Assessing the role that knowledge plays in the 
supply chain holds promise for deepening schol-
arly understanding and practitioner management 
of supply chain evolution. Viewing supply chains 
as inter-organizational networks characterized by 
dynamism, adaptability, and knowledge-based 
exchanges allows some ability to predict patterns 
of collaboration, and could also explain why the 
“integration prescription” provides such mixed 
outcomes.
Past research has highlighted the importance 
of balancing transaction and production costs in 
accordance with Coase’s original conceptualiza-
tion of TCE (Gravier and Farris, 2012). The im-
balance or balance of production vs. transaction 
costs may explain which supply chain strategies 
prove most effective or evolve out of a given set of 
circumstances (see Figure 8). If knowledge-based 
exchanges do indeed form the basis of supply 
chain evolution, then measuring the amount of 
knowledge inherent to the supply chain, as well 
as the ability of the supply chain to communicate 
knowledge efficiently, become important predic-
tors of supply chain performance. Information 
theory’s entropy provides precisely such a mea-
sure. Entropy—usually embodied by Shannon’s 
entropy—measures the amount of information 
content; additionally, the measurement also shows 
the absolute limit to the amount of information 
that can be carried in a given channel (Shannon, 
1948). As such, entropy holds the promise to 
measure the maximum complexity that a given 
supply chain can reasonably manage. Current ef-
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forts to measure entropy and apply it as a means 
of managing inter-organizational processes and 
operations demonstrate promise (c.f., Gravier and 
Kelly, 2012; Liu and Zhang, 2011). Assessing 
entropy would enable managers to assess whether 
collaboration and integration are on an upward 
or downward trend, and to assess trends against 
the propositions presented in this study in order 
to predict outcomes or explain shortcomings and 
success. Researchers could also apply the entropy 
measure to test this study’s propositions for em-
pirical validity.
With regard to changing paradigms in supply 
chain and inter-organizational knowledge manage-
ment research, the dominant paradigm resting on 
an essentially static or steady state suffers short-
comings in a world characterized by increasing 
change. In order to escape from a reactive ap-
proach, organizations need tools to anticipate 
dynamic trends. Rather than “agile” supply chains, 
organizations should evolve into adaptive networks 
whose members maintain enough autonomy to 
respond to their environments. Rather than provid-
ing prescriptive mandates for managing entire 
networks of firms—a process that can be slow 
and limits firm agility—more and more research-
ers are suggesting that the right inter-organiza-
tional architecture to allowed to “emerge” so that 
supply chains effectively manage themselves. 
Empirical evidence hints that inter-organization-
al information technology and information shar-
ing lead to improved supply chain performance 
outcomes, especially in situations where the firms 
work together over time and can evolve solutions 
(Prajogo and Olhager, 2012). Of course, it does 
appear that individual firms must first master 
Figure 8. Using production and transaction costs to predict supply chain designs
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integration within their own boundaries before 
they can effectively integrate with other firms 
(Huo, 2012), so this insight has as many implica-
tions for internal as it does for external decision-
making and strategizing.
As a last thought, this research effort suggests 
that certain roles of knowledge can actually reduce 
integration and collaboration, while others may 
increase them. Managers and researchers should 
consider investing more resources to investigat-
ing methods that combine the benefits of both 
highly collaborative and modular supply chain 
networks. Research suggests that a dual network 
structure may provide the benefits of both close 
collaboration and flexibility. Capaldo’s (2007) 
propositions suggest that a strong network near 
the hub of value creation with a weaker network 
to carry out distribution and other functions that 
do not add directly to the core value proposition 
may provide the best structure for certain supply 
chains. This suggests a boundary analogous to the 
customer decoupling point but instead of materi-
als flows or customer information determining 
the “push-pull” boundary, the amount and type 
of collaboration determines a collaborative in-
tensity boundary. From a theoretical standpoint, 
a collaborative intensity boundary offers a more 
pro-active approach to supply chain design since 
determining deficiencies and abundances in col-
laborative intensity ideally should precede mate-
rial flows or movement of customer information. 
Adopting a collaborative intensity perspective of 
supply chain networks finds support in the inter-
firm problem-solving research that also found that 
complex problems (slower rate of technological 
advance) favored integrated (highly collaborative) 
interfirm boundaries, whereas simpler problems 
that were well structured favored lower levels of 
integration (Macher, 2006).
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ENDNOTES
1  Small companies were a special case where 
δ was based on the current capacity (Ct) and 
the size of the requested upgrade (CU). In 
the case that Ct<3 and CU≤3Ct, then δ=1; if 
Ct<3 and CU≤4Ct, then δ equaled a constant.
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APPENDIX A
Key:
EOS = Economies of Scale
EMhet = End Market (heterogeneous)
EMhom = End Market (homogeneous)
RTA = Rate of Technological Advance
see Tables A1, A2, A3, A4
Table A1. Manufacturer-to-assembler selection parameter estimates by strategy 
Table A2. Assembler-to-manufacturer selection parameter estimates by strategy 
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Table A3. Assembler-to-retailer selection parameter estimates by strategy 
Table A4. Retailer-to-assembler selection parameter estimates by strategy 
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APPENDIX B: CREATE COMPUTATIONAL REPRESENTATION
In this section are included descriptions of variables and the equations utilized in the simulation.
Strategy
Each company used either a high quality or a low quality strategy. Companies following a high quality 
strategy did business exclusively with buyers and suppliers who also pursued a high quality strategy; 
companies following a low quality strategy similarly dealt exclusively with companies following a low 
quality strategy.
Life Points
Life points (λ) represented the health of the company. All companies started with the same number of life 
points. Companies gained or lost life points based on their capacity utilization (U). Companies making 
efficient use of existing capacity, as reflected by capacity utilization, were considered healthier and more 
resilient. Capacity utilization was calculated as a percent of a company’s maximum capacity based on 
the company’s sales, with the assumption that a company only produced to demand and sold all that it 
produced. If the capacity utilization fell below the survival threshold (θ), a life point was lost at a rate 
determined by a parameter called the basis point division parameter (β). The capacity utilization of 70% 
was in accordance with the recent U.S. Census Bureau plant capacity data (Bureau, 2005). Companies 
operating above this threshold gained a life point. Basis point division was arbitrarily set to 20; companies 
operating at capacity utilization between 50 and 70 lost one life point, companies operating at capacity 
utilization of 30-49 lose 2 life points, between 10-29 they lost 3 life points and at less than 10 they lost 
4 life points. Thus a company with a long history of being successful that had fallen upon hard times 
would take much longer to die than a newer company or one with a history of being less successful.
Node Deaths
When a node died, all of the capacity it provided both upstream and downstream was removed from the 
system before calculation of node differentials (see the sub-section on Capacity upgrades), so any capacity 
lost due to node death will be supplemented by the system. The process for removing the capacity ensured 
that all requirements from downstream demand were balanced against capacity amongst the suppliers.
Demand Volume
Demand volume was determined by a function following a Gaussian distribution determined by the 
volume of peak demand (Dmax) with a peak demand time step (τ) and a scale factor (s). Demand also 
used a random factor (p) that represented the percent variance from the value determined by the demand 
distribution function. This is shown below where rt is a random number between 0 and 1 and p is the 
specified “random” percent of variance (and which is also shown in Figure 5).





(( )/ )( )( )τ
2
1  
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Price
Price started out the same for both high and low end markets (PS). Demand was distinguished as being 
either high end demand (low price sensitivity) or low end demand (high price sensitivity) as determined 
by the established market price in each market. As demand increased, prices dropped in a linear fashion 
for both markets. It was implicitly assumed that price for both high and low end products would decline 
as the industry matured and price for low end product would always be less, or at most equal to, the price 
for high end product. As prices dropped, demand for low end product increased while demand for high 














where PL is the market price for the low end market and PH is the market price in the high end market. 















Production facilities of each company type (i.e., high end manufacturers, low end manufacturers, as-
semblers, and retailers) had an optimal economy of scale (κ), which increased as the industry matured, 
and changed linearly over time as determined by the optimum economy of scale size factor (ω). An 
optimum economy of scale size factor of one reflected a static growth of economies of scale, whereas 
ω=2 meant the economies of scale doubled over the course of the simulation.
Depending on the deviation of a plant’s current capacity from the optimum economies of scale, the 
plant could experience economies or diseconomies of scale. The closer the current capacity was to op-
timal capacity, the more efficient the company. The effect of economies of scale primarily influenced 
the decision to increase capacity. Firms would uniformly decide to increase capacity until the optimal 
capacity was reached; the probability that a firm would increase capacity thereafter was reflected by a 
Gaussian distribution (see the section on Capacity Upgrades).
Technology and Capacity Upgrades
Companies faced a moving technological frontier. In order to keep up with the rate of technological 
change, companies would periodically upgrade their capacity. Competition amongst companies depended 
on having up-to-date production facilities—keeping up was assumed to be the cost of entry. The process 
for upgrading technology was incorporated with the process for capacity upgrades. As a result, early 
in the simulation companies tended to upgrade technology and capacity simultaneously, but as they 
reached their optimal economies of scale, technology upgrades would tend to occur without increases to 
capacity. The upgrade recovery time parameter (ζ) determined the pace at which plant capacity became 
obsolete and needed upgrading.
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Upgrades also included increases to plant production capacity. The decision to upgrade depended 
on three factors: 1) recovery time since last upgrade, 2) relative size of upgrade, and 3) the economies 
of scale of the resulting upgrade. The decision to upgrade capacity occurred when the product of the 
three factors exceeded the company’s upgrade decision threshold (υ). A brief description of each of the 
three factors follows:
1.  Recovery time since last upgrade (ρ): This function was based upon the number of time steps 
since the last capacity upgrade. When the time since the last capacity upgrade reached the upgrade 





2.  Relative size of upgrade (δ): Companies tend to avoid investing in trivial amounts of capacity 
upgrade; instead, they wait until it is worth their while. Companies also avoid making upgrades too 
rapidly lest they get ahead of the market. For example, an upgrade of only one unit was unlikely to 
occur, while an upgrade of 50% was likely to be much more useful. This function annotated current 
capacity with Ct, the size of a requested upgrade with CU, and followed a Gaussian distribution 
designed so a requested capacity upgrade of 50% returned δ =1 (see equation below). Very small 
companies (with a capacity of 1 or 2) were handled differently with a “start up factor” allowing 


















3.  Economy of scale of the resulting upgrade (γ): This function led the company to uniformly in-
crease capacity until it reached the optimum economy of scale. The result of the function depended 
on the company capacity at the optimum economy of scale (κ) and the company’s new capacity 
if the upgrade was implemented (Ct+ CU). The economy of scale of the resulting upgrade (γ) was 























(C  Ct U  
A decision threshold (υ) determined when an individual company make an upgrade decision. The 
decision threshold was constant for the entire simulation system, with individual companies making their 
decision to upgrade when the product of the three factors was greater than the decision threshold (ρδγ> 
υ). A product function was used for calculating the decision threshold due to advancing economies of 
scale, which also affected the magnitude of the relative size of the upgrade; a product function kept all 
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parameters to the same scale. The upgrade parameter (υ) was set based upon trial and error depending 
corresponding with the optimum economy of scale. Upgrading capacity went through the following 
recursion logic:
1.  Beginning at the consumer end of the supply chain, the virtual transaction cost vector was created to 
map transaction costs with each active company to all other active companies of the same strategy 
in the upstream vector.
2.  The virtual transaction cost vector was ordered from lowest to highest. In the case of declining 
demand, the vector was sorted highest to lowest.
3.  The ordered transaction cost vector was searched by the downstream node for unused capacity 
which could be used if available. In the face of declining demand, relationships with the highest 
virtual transaction costs were eliminated first.
4.  If no unused capacity was available, the downstream firm requested upgrades using the ordered 
virtual transaction cost vector to order additional capacity from a supplier.
5.  If no supplier agreed to provide enough needed capacity, a new company was created for the unmet 
capacity. If the increase in demand was less than half the optimal economy of scale capacity for a 
retailer, then the demand was left unmet.
Virtual Transaction Costs
Virtual transaction costs were used to determine the relative cost associated with a transaction. It con-
sisted of the sum of four transaction cost factors between buyer i and supplier j: total units, current units, 
economy of scale, and life of company. These virtual transaction “costs” were considered by each buyer 
as it selected a supplier with whom to do business. This reflected the movement of demand information 
up the supply chain. Buyers always selected suppliers in the order of lowest to highest virtual transaction 
cost in keeping with the desire to seek out the most efficient relationship available, with a bias toward 
suppliers that were familiar. Each virtual transaction cost factor is briefly described below:
1.  Total units cost (χij): Total units cost resulted from the total number of units ever exchanged be-








This cost began at one and decreased over time as two companies continued to do business.
2.  Current units cost (νij): The units exchanged in the current cycle between two companies (nij) re-
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3.  Economy of scale cost (ιj): This virtual transaction cost depended on the buyer’s capacity in rela-
tion to its optimum economy of scale. This cost ranged from 0 (optimum) to 0.1 (least optimum) 





















4.  Life of company cost (φj): This cost started at 0.5 and diminished as the company matured and 







MODEL VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION
Verification relied on three techniques described by Law and Kelton (2000). The first technique entailed 
the writing and debugging of the program in modules or sub-programs. The process started with the 
main program consisting of the supply chain network interacting without transaction costs or capacity 
decisions. Then the sub-routine for transaction costs were implemented and debugged. Absolute transac-
tion costs were originally envisioned; however, it quickly became apparent that the relative transaction 
costs between firms determined the outcomes of relationships. This agreed with Coase’s vision of “an 
outside network of relative prices and costs” (1937, p. p. 389). A virtual transaction cost interaction 
vector was developed based on the exchange history (number of units exchanged), the current exchange 
(number of units), actual vs. optimal economies of scale, and the life of the company (number of cycles 
the company has been active). The virtual transaction cost resulted in the expected model behavior based 
upon TCA theory.
Capacity decision processes were implemented using a sub-program that incorporated two aspects 
of the capacity upgrade decision: 1) increasing the magnitude of capacity, and 2) upgrading product 
ensuing from the advancing technological frontier. The capacity decision process exhibited expected 
behavior based upon extant production literature with production capacity increasing and decreasing as 
the consequence of demand in the next level of the SCN (supply chain network) as well as following the 
increasing economies of scale and periodic upgrades to keep up with the technological frontier.
The second verification technique engaged more than one person using a “structured walk-through of 
the program” (Law & Kelton, 2000, p. p. 270). One author conducted a line-by-line walk-through with 
a mathematician who had no formal education or experience with TCA or market governance theory 
in order to assess two aspects of the computer program. First, the program’s relationship validity was 
assessed to ensure the program accurately reflected the relationships between key variables as predicted 
by theory. Then the walk-through scrutinized the validity of the equations to model specific relationships 
between the variables.
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The third verification technique checked robustness or sensitivity of the simulation to a variety of input 
parameters. The model was run under a variety of settings to authenticate these key simulation processes:
1.  TCA processes,
2.  Node death and birth processes,
3.  Capacity decision processes,
4.  Robustness checks for the simulation model as a whole over a range of parameter settings.
In all cases, the model behaved in accordance expectations. Random demand fluctuation led to the 
most unstable model response once random deviance from the demand curve reached 10%. At this 
point, the model exhibited excessively high node mortality throughout the simulation, in turn leading 
to underserved markets, low collaboration index scores, and generally unstable model behavior. For 
the rest of the parameter settings the model proved highly robust and certainly sufficient to model any 
realistic supply chain scenarios
